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TEXAS GULF SULPHUR: A CASE STUDY
ON RESPONDING TO MARKET RUMORS
Wendy G. Couture*
ABSTRACT
This essay uses Texas Gulf Sulphur as a case study on an issue that com-
panies continue to face today: whether, and how, to respond to market ru-
mors. This essay analyzes the countervailing incentives that influence
whether companies respond to market rumors, applies those pressures to
the facts of Texas Gulf Sulphur, and concludes that counsel today would
likely advise similarly situated companies to remain silent rather than re-
spond to market rumors. Drawing therefrom, this essay argues that silence
is not the socially optimal response and that the dueling pressures on com-
panies should be adjusted to incentivize companies to respond to market
rumors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 676
II. PRESENTATION OF TEXAS GULF SULPHUR CASE
STUDY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 676
A. TEXAS GULF SULPHUR’S RESPONSE TO MARKET
RUMORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 676
B. TEXAS GULF SULPHUR’S LIABILITY FOR RESPONDING
TO MARKET RUMORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 678
C. RECOGNITION OF THE QUANDARY THAT TEXAS GULF
SULPHUR FACED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 680
III. ANALYSIS OF TEXAS GULF SULPHUR CASE
STUDY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 681
A. KEY PRESSURES ON PUBLIC COMPANIES TO RESPOND
TO MARKET RUMORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 682
1. SEC Rules Requiring Disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 682
2. Stock Exchange Listing Standards Requiring
Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 683
3. Market Forces Incentivizing Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . 685
B. KEY PRESSURES ON ISSUERS TO REMAIN SILENT IN
RESPONSE TO EXTERNALLY-SOURCED MARKET
RUMORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 687
1. Liability for Misleading Disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 687
* Wendy Gerwick Couture is a Professor of Law at the University of Idaho, where
she teaches securities regulation, business associations, and white collar crime.
675
676 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
2. Business Reasons for Silence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 690
3. Avoidance of Confusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 690
C. COUNSEL’S LIKELY ADVICE TO TEXAS GULF SULPHUR
TODAY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 691
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF TEXAS GULF SULPHUR CASE
STUDY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 692
A. ARGUMENT THAT SILENCE IS NOT SOCIALLY
OPTIMAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 693
B. PROPOSAL TO INCENTIVIZE ISSUERS TO RESPOND TO
RUMORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 694
V. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 695
I. INTRODUCTION
ALTHOUGH the Second Circuit’s opinion in SEC v. Texas GulfSulphur Co. (hereinafter “Texas Gulf Sulphur”) was issued fiftyyears ago,1 the quandary that Texas Gulf Sulphur (hereinafter
“TGS”) faced still resonates today: whether, and how, to respond to mar-
ket rumors. Companies today still face dueling pressures, with some in-
centivizing response and others incentivizing silence. In this essay, I seek
to analyze those countervailing incentives, using Texas Gulf Sulphur as a
case study, and, drawing therefrom, to propose a modest reform.
This essay proceeds in four parts. In Part II, I present the case study,
explaining the quandary that TGS faced and the fallout from its choice.
In Part III, I analyze the competing pressures currently facing public
companies and apply those pressures to TGS, concluding that counsel to-
day would likely advise companies like TGS to remain silent rather than
respond to market rumors. Drawing therefrom, in Part IV, I argue that
the countervailing pressures on companies should be adjusted to incen-
tivize companies like TGS to respond to market rumors and propose such
an adjustment. Finally, Part V briefly concludes.
II. PRESENTATION OF TEXAS GULF SULPHUR CASE STUDY
As summarized below, in the face of optimistic market rumors, TGS
elected to quell those rumors with a rather pessimistic press release. This
choice exposed TGS to liability for securities fraud, exemplifying compa-
nies’ quandary when faced with market rumors.
A. TEXAS GULF SULPHUR’S RESPONSE TO MARKET RUMORS
TGS was engaged in exploratory mining activities in Canada.2 Begin-
ning on November 8, 1963, the company drilled a series of holes near
Timmons, Ontario, which eventually led to the discovery of “a strike of
1. See generally SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
2. Id. at 843.
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least 25 million tons of ore.”3 The company publicly announced the dis-
covery at 10:00 a.m. on April 16, 1964.4 In the interim, however, the fol-
lowing rumors were reported in the press about the potential discovery,
some of which were arguably misleadingly optimistic in light of the facts
then known to TGS:
[O]n April 9 Toronto newspapers reported that TGS had discovered
‘one of the largest copper deposits in North America,’ ‘a major cop-
per strike. . . .’5
. . .
. . . [On April 11] [t]he Herald Tribune article announced that TGS
had ‘the biggest ore strike since gold was discovered more than 60
years ago in Canada * * * a bed of copper sulphide 600 feet wide
with a possible over-all copper return of 2.87% [t]hrough most of its
width.’; that TGS had four drill rigs in operation with four more to
go into operation the following week; and that the richness of the
copper was so great that it had been flown out of Canada to be
assayed. . . .6
A quantity of false statistics appeared in the press, the company was
accused of illegal conduct, and it was erroneously reported that a
“penny stock” mining company was a partner with Texas Gulf in the
exploration.7
In the face of these swirling rumors, TGS faced the difficult decision
about whether to address the rumors before it believed that it had suffi-
cient information to publicly announce the discovery. At 3:00 p.m. on
April 12, 1964, the company issued a press release responding to the mar-
ket rumors.8 The press release included the following statements:
‘During the past few days, the exploration activities of Texas Gulf
Sulphur in the area of Timmins, Ontario, have been widely reported
in the press, coupled with rumors of a substantial copper discovery
there. These reports exaggerate the scale of operations, and mention
plans and statistics of size and grade of ore that are without factual
basis and have evidently originated by speculation of people not con-
nected with TGS. . . .’9
. . .
. . . ‘Numerous prospects have been investigated by geophysical
means and a large number of selected ones have been core-drilled.
These cores are sent to the United States for assay and detailed ex-
amination as a matter of routine and on advice of expert Canadian
legal counsel. No inferences as to grade can be drawn from this
3. Id. at 843, 846.
4. Id. at 846.
5. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
6. Id. at 293–94 (alteration in original).
7. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10, Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. v. SEC, 404 U.S. 1005
(1971) (No. 71-327).
8. See Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 845.
9. Id.
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procedure. . . .’10
. . . ‘Recent drilling on one property near Timmins has led to prelimi-
nary indications that more drilling would be required for proper
evaluation of this prospect. The drilling done to date has not been
conclusive, but the statements made by many outside quarters are
unreliable and include information and figures that are not available
to TGS. . . .’11
. . .’The work done to date has not been sufficient to reach definite
conclusions and any statement as to size and grade of ore would be
premature and possibly misleading. When we have progressed to the
point where reasonable and logical conclusions can be made, TGS
will issue a definite statement to its stockholders and to the public in
order to clarify the Timmins project.’12
Between the April 12 press release and the April 16 public announce-
ment, the company completed additional drilling and encountered addi-
tional mineralization, thus arguably explaining its dramatic shift in tone
over a short period of time.13
B. TEXAS GULF SULPHUR’S LIABILITY FOR RESPONDING TO
MARKET RUMORS
The SEC, as well as investors who had sold TGS stock between the
April 12 press release and the April 16 public announcement, brought
suit against TGS for securities fraud under § 10(b)14 and Rule 10b-5,15
alleging that the April 12 press release was materially misleading in its
pessimism. The SEC contended that the press release was fraudulent be-
cause, when the press release was issued, “TGS knew that it had discov-
ered a copper mine on the Kidd 55 segment and that the press release
was materially misleading in characterizing this discovery as a ‘prospect’
and in stating that ‘any statement as to size and grade of ore would be
premature.’”16
After a bench trial, the district court initially found that TGS had not
violated § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because (1) absent evidence that the pur-
pose of the press release was “to affect the market price of TGS stock to
the advantage of TGS or its insiders,” the April 10 press release was not
issued “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security;”17 and (2)





13. See id. at 846.
14. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
15. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2017).
16. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 292–93 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
17. Id. at 294.
18. Id.
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On appeal, the Second Circuit, considering the case en banc, reversed
the judgment dismissing the complaint against TGS and remanded the
Rule 10b-5 claim against TGS.19 The Second Circuit held that the press
release was “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security” be-
cause it was “reasonably calculated to influence the investing public.”20
The Second Circuit further held that the district court had failed to apply
“the appropriate primary inquiry into the meaning of the statement to the
reasonable investor and its relationship to truth.”21 Therefore, the Second
Circuit remanded the case to the district court “for a determination of the
character of the release in light of the facts existing at the time of the
release, by applying the standard of whether the reasonable investor, in
the exercise of due care, would have been misled by it.”22
On remand, the district court heard testimony from shareholders that
the press release’s usage of words “such as ‘without factual basis,’ ‘mis-
leading,’ ‘premature,’ and ‘exaggerated’ . . . indicated to them that the
rumors as to the Timmins discovery were unfounded and that there was
either no discovery or, if there was, it was not as rich as it was rumored to
be.”23 The court also found that TGS “did not exercise due diligence in
its issuance.”24 Therefore, the court found that TGS had violated Rule
10b-5, but the court denied the SEC’s application for a permanent injunc-
tion because there was not a proper showing of a reasonable likelihood of
future violations by TGS.25 On a second appeal, the Second Circuit af-
firmed the district court’s rulings with respect to TGS.26
Similarly, investors who had sold TGS stock in the period between the
April 12 press release and the April 16 public announcement asserted
private claims for securities fraud, contending that the press release was
“false and misleading” and that “they would not have sold had they
known the true facts which were announced by TGS in a press release
issued four days later.”27 In addition to individual actions asserted by va-
rious investors,28 a federal district court in the Southern District of New
York conditionally certified a class of “Reliance Claimants who sold their
19. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 864 (2d Cir. 1968).
20. Id. at 862.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 863.
23. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971).
24. Id. at 86.
25. Id. at 88.
26. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1306 (2d Cir. 1971) (“The finding
that TGS violated 10b-5 is well-founded and, in our view, unassailable, and though TGS
argues that the complaint should be dismissed as to it inasmuch as the injunction the SEC
sought was not granted, we affirm the denial of an injunction without dismissing the com-
plaint as a proper discretionary decision by the trial judge under the circumstances.”).
27. Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 55 F.R.D. 308, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
28. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 107 (10th Cir. 1971)
(affirming judgments against TGS and one of its officers for securities fraud on the basis of
the April 12 press release and remanding for entry of judgments in favor of two investors
who sold TGS stock in reliance on the press release, with damages calculated at $7,600.00
for one and at $12,687.50 for the other).
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stock between April 12 and 10:55 A.M. on April 16, 1964 at a price of $33
per share or less.”29 The court ultimately approved a settlement pursuant
to which TGS paid the Reliance Claimants $2,200,000.30
C. RECOGNITION OF THE QUANDARY THAT TEXAS GULF SULPHUR
FACED
Throughout the SEC litigation, courts acknowledged the difficulty of
TGS’s disclosure decision when faced with market rumors. In its first
opinion after the bench trial, the district court recognized that TGS’s ex-
ecutives “were under considerable pressure”:
If they said too much, they would have been open to criticism and
possible liability if it turned out that TGS had not discovered a com-
mercial mine. If they said too little and later announced a mine, they
subjected themselves to the charge that their press release was mis-
leading or deceptive—and, indeed, this is what has happened.31
The Second Circuit also acknowledged the quandary that TGS faced, de-
spite rejecting TGS’s argument that it served to excuse a misleading
response:
The avoidance of liability for misrepresentation in the event that the
Timmons project failed, a highly unlikely event as of April 12 or
April 13, did not forbid the accurate and truthful divulgence of de-
tailed results which need not, of course, have been accompanied by
conclusory assertions of success. Nor is it any justification that such
an explicit disclosure of the truth might have “encouraged the rumor
mill which they were seeking to allay.”32
Similarly, Judge Friendly’s concurrence recognized the difficulty of TGS’s
decision, especially in light of the potential for private civil liability:
If the only choices open to a corporation are either to remain silent
and let false rumors do their work, or to make a communication, not
legally required, at the risk that a slip of the pen or failure properly
to amass or weigh the facts—all judged in the bright gleam of hind-
sight—will lead to large judgments, payable in the last analysis by
innocent investors, for the benefit of speculators and their lawyers,
most corporations would opt for the former.33
Judge Moore’s dissent framed the issue most starkly, including a plea for
additional guidance for issuers:
When and how are promising results to be disclosed. If they are not
disclosed, the corporation is concealing information; if disclosed and
hoped-for results do not materialize, there will always be those with
the advantage of hindsight to brand them as false or misleading. . . .
29. Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., No. 65-Civ-1223, 1973 WL 417, at *1 (Aug. 7,
1973).
30. Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 55 F.R.D. 308, 311 (1972).
31. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
32. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 864 (2d Cir. 1968).
33. Id. at 867 (Friendly, J., concurring).
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May the Future, the Congress or possibly the SEC itself be able to
bring some semblance of order by means of workable rules and regu-
lations in this field so that the corporations and their stockholders
may not be subjected to countless lawsuits at the whim of every pur-
chaser, seller or potential purchaser who may claim he would have
acted or refrained from acting had a news release been more com-
prehensive, less comprehensive or had it been adequately published
in the news media of the 50 States.34
Since Texas Gulf Sulphur, scholars35 and the SEC36 have struggled to
provide guidance to public companies facing this quandary. Indeed, in
light of the rise of the internet, this issue is perhaps even more pressing
today,37 particularly with recent research demonstrating that false rumors
are more likely to spread virally on social media than truthful ones.38
III. ANALYSIS OF TEXAS GULF SULPHUR CASE STUDY
Absent a duty to disclose, companies may remain silent.39 If a company
is the source of an inaccurate market rumor, it likely has a duty to correct
the inaccuracy; if a company is not the source of a market rumor, how-
ever, it potentially has the option to remain silent rather than correcting
or verifying the rumor.40
When public companies are considering whether to respond to exter-
nally-sourced market rumors, they face multiple countervailing pressures.
Although companies today continue to confront the same difficult deci-
sion as TGS about whether to respond or remain silent, the competing
pressures affecting their disclosure decisions have evolved since Texas
Gulf Sulphur. In order to exemplify those modern pressures, this case
study applies them to TGS’s disclosure decision as if the company faced it
today. Although the Texas Gulf Sulphur record is silent about whether
34. Id. at 888–89 (Moore, J., dissenting).
35. E.g., John M. Sheffey, Securities Law Responsibilities of Issuers to Respond to Ru-
mors and Other Publicity: Reexamination of a Continuing Problem, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW
REV. 755, 755 (1982) (“A common and recurring problem facing corporate management
and counsel is whether some action should be taken to correct or respond to inaccurate
publicly disseminated information concerning the corporation.”).
36. See, e.g., SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SEC ROUNDTABLE: MARKET RUMORS AND
TRADING HALTS 3 (Feb. 19, 1986) (“The SEC Roundtable on Market Rumors and Trading
Halts was convened to discuss disclosure of merger negotiations, trading halts, and the
origins and effects of rumors in the marketplace.”).
37. See HOWARD M. FRIEDMAN, Responding to Online Rumors and Cybergossip, in
SECURITIES REGULATIONS IN CYBERSPACE § 11.05 (2017) (“When the power of modern
social media is coupled with the impact of computerized high-frequency trading, malicious
rumors can have a particularly powerful impact.”).
38. See Soroush Vosoughi et al., The Spread of Trust and False News Online, 359 SCI-
ENCE 1146, 1147 (2018) (finding that “[f]alsehood diffused significantly farther, faster,
deeper, and more broadly than the truth in all categories of information,” including false
business information).
39. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988).
40. See Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738, 744 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Obviously a
corporation has no duty to correct rumors planted by third parties.”); State Teachers Ret.
Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 850 (2d Cir. 1981) (“A company has no duty to correct or
verify rumors in the marketplace unless those rumors can be attributed to the company.”).
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any of the market rumors could be traced back to TGS, this case study
assumes that the rumors were externally-sourced.
A. KEY PRESSURES ON PUBLIC COMPANIES TO RESPOND TO
MARKET RUMORS
Three key pressures potentially incentivize public companies to re-
spond to externally-sourced market rumors: (1) SEC rules requiring dis-
closure; (2) stock exchange listing standards requiring response; and (3)
market forces incentivizing response.
1. SEC Rules Requiring Disclosure
Generally, SEC rules require only periodic disclosure of specified in-
formation by public companies, including annual reports on Form 10-K,41
quarterly reports on Form 10-Q,42 and current reports on Form 8-K.43
Current reports must be filed within four business days after specific trig-
gering events (like entry into a material definitive agreement or a mate-
rial impairment),44 or sooner in order to prevent selective disclosure
prohibited by Regulation FD.45 Exceptions to these circumscribed disclo-
sure duties apply if the company is repurchasing its own securities46 or if
a specific transaction triggers additional disclosure requirements.47
Under current rules, it is largely happenstance whether a company
must disclose information about the substance underlying market rumors,
as it is dependent on (1) the timing of the rumors and (2) the subject
matter of the rumors. First, if market rumors are swirling when a com-
pany’s Form 10-Q or Form 10-K is due, and if the rumors also touch on a
topic that must be disclosed in the periodic filing, then the company’s
filing would, in effect, address the rumors by discussing the substance un-
derlying them. Second, if market rumors relate to a topic about which the
company is already required to file a current report, then the company’s
Form 8-K would, effectively, address the rumors by providing informa-
tion about the underlying subject matter. Third, if the rumors are circulat-
ing when the company is also repurchasing its own securities, and if the
41. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-1, 240.15d-1, 249.310 (2017).
42. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-13, 240.15d-13, 249.308a.
43. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-11, 240.15d-11, 249.308.
44. 17 C.F.R. § 249.308.
45. 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100–.103.
46. See ALAN R. BROMBERG ET AL., 3 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES
FRAUD § 6:186 (2d ed. 2017) (“When a company is trading in its own securities, courts have
said it has a duty to disclose all material information, including acquisition negotiations.”);
SEC Release Notice, Timely Disclosure of Material Corporate Developments, Release No.
5092 (Oct. 15, 1970), 1970 WL 10576, at *2 (“It should be noted that unless adequate and
accurate information is available, a company may not be able to purchase its own securities
or make acquisitions using its securities, and its insiders may not be able to trade its securi-
ties without running a serious risk of violating § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and Rule 10b–5 thereunder.”).
47. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2012) (5% acquisitions); 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (third-party
tender offers) (exemplifying the statutes covering transactions that would invoke addi-
tional disclosure duties).
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rumors relate to material information, then the company, by disclosing all
material information, would thereby address the substance of the rumors.
Finally, if the rumors relate to a specific transaction that triggers an inde-
pendent disclosure obligation, then the mandated disclosures about that
transaction would likewise have the impact of addressing the rumors.
Applying these rules to TGS, it is unlikely that, even today, the com-
pany would be required to discuss the substance of the market rumors in
an SEC filing. First, the deadlines for filing Forms 10-Q and Forms 10-K
depend on a company’s fiscal year and issuer classification,48 but it is un-
likely that these deadlines would happen to coincide with the circulation
of rumors.49 Second, although Form 8-K requires the disclosure of speci-
fied current information, none of the line items would mandate an update
on the status of TGS’s exploration activities,50 absent the need to prevent
selective disclosure under Regulation FD.51 Finally, TGS was neither re-
purchasing its own securities at the time of the rumors nor engaging in a
specific transaction that would compel additional disclosure.
2. Stock Exchange Listing Standards Requiring Response
Stock exchange listing standards generally require companies to re-
spond promptly to market rumors. For example, the New York Stock Ex-
change (“NYSE”) Listed Company Manual states: “If rumors or unusual
market activity indicate that information on impending developments has
leaked out, a frank and explicit announcement is clearly required.”52 This
requirement applies regardless of whether the rumors are true53 or
false,54 even if prompt disclosure would inconvenience the company.55
The NYSE American56 (formerly the American Stock Exchange) and
48. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 249.310, 249.308a (2017).
49. However, if these deadlines did happen to coincide, TGS’s management would
likely be required to discuss its exploration activities in its Management, Discussion &
Analysis. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (requiring management to discuss any known trends or
any known demands, commitments, events, or uncertainties that are reasonably expected
to have a material impact on results of operations, liquidity, or capital resources).
50. See 17 C.F.R. § 249.308.
51. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100–.103.
52. NYSE LISTED CO. MANUAL § 202.03 (Sept. 2, 2015), 1992 WL 12137711, at *1.
53. Id. (“If rumors are correct or there are developments, an immediate candid state-
ment to the public as to the state of negotiations or of development of corporate plans in
the rumored area must be made directly and openly.”).
54. Id. (“If rumors are in fact false or inaccurate, they should be promptly denied or
clarified.”).
55. Id. (“Such statements are essential despite the business inconvenience which may
be caused and even though the matter may not as yet have been presented to the com-
pany’s Board of Directors for consideration.”).
56. NYSE AMERICAN LLC CO. GUIDE § 401(c) (Mar. 11, 2016) (“Clarification or
Confirmation of Rumors or Reports—Whenever a listed company becomes aware of a ru-
mor or report, true or false, that contains information that is likely to have, or has had, an
effect on the trading in its securities, or would be likely to have a bearing on investment
decisions, the company is required to publicly clarify the rumor or report as promptly as
possible.”); id. at § 402 (“Explanation of Exchange Disclosure Policies”) (“If rumors con-
cerning such [temporarily withheld] information should develop, immediate public disclo-
sure becomes necessary.”).
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NASDAQ impose similar prompt disclosure requirements, although
NASDAQ provides some leeway for “unusual circumstances.”57
Although these listing standards require companies to respond
promptly to market rumors, companies generally do not have a strong
incentive to comply therewith, especially before receiving a specific in-
quiry from an exchange. A company’s violation of disclosure listing stan-
dards does not give rise to a private right of action.58 An exchange could
theoretically sanction a company for violating its listing standards, includ-
ing public reprimand, suspension of trading, or delisting,59 but the com-
mon wisdom among practitioners is that these sanctions are seldom, if
ever, imposed for failing to respond to market rumors.60 Moreover, com-
57. THE NASDAQ STOCK MARKET RULES, RULE 5250(b)(1) (2009) (“Except in unu-
sual circumstances, a Nasdaq-listed Company shall make prompt disclosure to the public
through any Regulation FD compliant method (or combination of methods) of disclosure
of any material information that would reasonably be expected to affect the value of its
securities or influence investors’ decisions.”); id. at IM-5250-1 (“If rumors or unusual mar-
ket activity indicate that information on impending developments has become known to
the investing public, or if information from a source other than the Company becomes
known to the investing public, a clear public announcement may be required as to the state
of negotiations or development of Company plans. Such an announcement may be re-
quired, even though the Company may not have previously been advised of such informa-
tion or the matter has not yet been presented to the Company’s Board of Directors for
consideration. In certain circumstances, it may also be appropriate to publicly deny false or
inaccurate rumors, which are likely to have, or have had, an effect on the trading in its
securities or would likely have an influence on investment decisions.”) (emphasis added).
58. See State Teachers Ret. Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 852–53 (2d Cir. 1981)
(“In the case at bar, we are faced with a corporation’s obligations under section A2 of the
Exchange Company’s Manual to disclose general corporate news. . . . [S]ection A2 of the
Exchange’s Company Manual touches upon areas of corporate activity already extensively
regulated by Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission. Thus, a legislative
intent to permit a federal claim for violation of the Exchange’s Company Manual regard-
ing disclosure of corporate news cannot be inferred.”).
59. E.g., NYSE LISTED CO. MANUAL, PUBLIC REPRIMAND LETTER, COMMENTARY
§ 303A.13 (Nov. 25, 2009), 2003 WL 23737131, at *1 (“Suspending trading in or delisting a
listed company can be harmful to the very shareholders that the NYSE listing standards
seek to protect; the NYSE must therefore use these measures sparingly and judiciously. For
this reason it is appropriate for the NYSE to have the ability to apply a lesser sanction to
deter companies from violating its corporate governance (or other) listing standards. . . .
For companies that repeatedly or flagrantly violate NYSE listing standards, suspension and
delisting remain the ultimate penalties.”); id. at § 802.01D (“Other factors which may lead
to a company’s delisting include . . . [t]he failure of a company to make timely, adequate,
and accurate disclosures of information to its shareholders and the investing public.”).
60. See, e.g., AARON RACHELSON, CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, MERGERS, & DIVESTI-
TURES § 4:87 (2017) (“The exchanges’ only practical remedy if a corporation refuses to
respond is to suspend trading of the corporation’s stock. Exchanges hesitate to pursue such
a remedy.”); BRIAN M. O’NEILL, MODERN CORPORATION CHECKLISTS § 19:21 (2017)
(“Responding to questions concerning rumored M&A negotiations”) (“If a company ref-
uses to comment, the stock exchange’s only practical remedy is to suspend trading of the
company’s stock. Stock exchanges are usually hesitant to pursue such a remedy.”); Memo-
randum from Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, Alert Memo: Communication with
Financial Analysts and Related Disclosure Issues, at 14 n.59 (Feb. 25, 2013), [https://
perma.cc/XLF7-KA8H] (“It is important to note that while the NYSE and Nasdaq place
more onerous duties upon companies in this regard, violations of their disclosure rules
have been held not to give rise to private causes of action, no issuer’s shares have been
delisted for violation of the policy and many companies adhere to a no-comment policy if
there are rumors of (sic) unusual market activity.”); Daniel L. Goelzer et al., Securities
Law Compliance: Dealing With Analysts and the Press, C800 ALI-ABA 97, 135 (1992) (“In
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panies generally do not feel compelled by the listing standards to proac-
tively address market rumors until such time as an exchange’s stock-
watch committee contacts the company. Finally, even if an exchange
makes an inquiry, the company may be able to convince the exchange to
permit a delayed response by citing business reasons for confidentiality,
even if that delay is not explicitly permitted by the listing standards.61
Applying these listing standards to TGS, it is unlikely that the company
today would feel compelled by the standards to respond proactively to
the market rumors. TGS’s stock was listed on the NYSE.62 Even in 1964,
the NYSE Manual included a disclosure requirement similar to the one
included today.63 Although this listing standard was cited in the Texas
Gulf Sulphur record, the record does not suggest that anyone from the
exchange had contacted TGS prior to its press release. Therefore, absent
an inquiry from the exchange, the listing standards would probably not
serve as a strong incentive for TGS to respond to the market rumors.
3. Market Forces Incentivizing Response
Various market forces may incentivize companies to respond to ru-
mors. In general, consistent with the SEC’s policy of full disclosure (albeit
not mandated by SEC rules),64 “it is in the company’s interest to keep the
analyst and investor communities well-informed and to employ a ‘no sur-
prises’ philosophy.”65 If a company withholds important information, in-
theory, a company which fails to comply with applicable listing requirements could be de-
listed or subjected to a trading suspension by the exchange or association. As a practical
matter, this is exceedingly unlikely to occur as a consequence of an isolated failure to
disclose information, especially where the information was not required to be disclosed by
SEC periodic reporting or antifraud requirements.”).
61. Broc Romanek & Mark S. Britton, Online Shareholder Activism: How to Guard
Against Its Fallout, 20 No. 5 ACCA DOCKET 32, 38 (2002) (“On the other hand, in prac-
tice, companies may not be forced to address a rumor by its exchange if it has a valid
business reason to remain silent.”); Jeffrey B. Rudman et al., D&O Liability in Cyberspace:
Taking Advantage of Technology Without Tripping over the Federal Securities Laws Part
III of III, 15 No. 18 ANDREWS OFF. & DIR. LIAB. LITIG. REP. 16, 19 (2000) (“In practice,
the operation of the self-regulatory organizations’ rules is less than certain. In many cases,
no disclosure will be required if the company has a valid business reason for not making
the disclosure. A company should, therefore, seek the assistance of qualified legal counsel
before making any statements commenting on rumors in the marketplace.”).
62. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., F. Supp. 262, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
63. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 878 n.2 (2d Cir. 1968) (Moore, J.,
dissenting) (quoting the NYSE Company Manual) (“Dealing with Rumors Affecting the
Market: Occasions may also arise when rumors have been circulated which have no basis
in fact or which require clarification or interpretation and which also result in unusual
activity or price changes in a particular security. Under such circumstances, the most effec-
tive procedure is the quick and speedy denial of such rumors through a release to the
public Press.”).
64. SEC Release Notice, Timely Disclosure of Material Corporate Developments, Re-
lease No. 5092 (Oct. 15, 1970), 1970 WL 10576, at *2 (“Corporate managements are urged
to review their policies with respect to corporate disclosure and endeavor to set up proce-
dures which will insure that prompt disclosure be made of material corporate develop-
ments, both favorable and unfavorable, so that investor confidence can be maintained in
an orderly and effective securities market.”).
65. Daniel L. Goelzer et al., Securities Law Compliance: Dealing with Analysts and the
Press, C800 ALI-ABA 97, 150 (1992).
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vestors may avoid the company’s securities altogether or discount them
because of the lack of information.66 In addition to these general market
forces incentivizing disclosure, specific market forces incentivize compa-
nies to respond to market rumors, although those forces vary depending
on whether the rumors are true or false, and on whether the rumors re-
flect positively or negatively on the company.
If the rumors are true, regardless of whether they reflect positively or
negatively on a company, the company has an incentive to respond in
order to prevent the perception that those “in the know” have an advan-
tage, which could dissuade others from investing in the company’s securi-
ties.67 In addition, if the rumors are true and reflect positively on the
company, the company may have an incentive to disclose the information
sooner rather than later to prevent the oft-occurring phenomenon
whereby, upon the company’s eventual disclosure of the positive informa-
tion, the stock price actually drops because so many investors “[bought]
on the rumor.”68 If the rumors are false and reflect positively on the com-
pany, the company has an incentive to address the rumors in order to
avoid alienating (upon eventual disclosure of the truth) those who invest
on the basis of the false rumors.69 If the rumors are false and reflect
poorly on the company, the company has an incentive to address the ru-
mors in order to allay the worries of various stakeholders (including em-
ployees and investors) and to protect its reputation.70 Indeed, the
literature on corporate crisis management classifies false, negative rumors
about a company as a type of crisis and recommends that companies pro-
66. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Pro-
tection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 684 (1984) (“A firm that wants the highest possible
price when it issues stock must take all cost-justified steps to make the stock valuable in the
aftermarket, so it must make a believable pledge to continue disclosing.”).
67. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SEC ROUNDTABLE: MARKET RUMORS AND TRADING
HALTS 6 (Feb. 19, 1986) (comments of William A. Schreyer, Chairman of Merrill Lynch &
Company Inc.) (“Mr. Levitt agreed with Mr. Phelan that rumors are difficult to define, but
commented that the public’s perception that some persons have an advantage in the mar-
kets will hurt the markets.”).
68. See Richard Peterson, “Buy on the Rumor:” Anticipatory Effect and Investor Be-
havior, 3 J. PSYCHOL. & FIN. MARKETS 218, 218 (2002) (“The traders’ aphorism ‘buy on
the rumor and sell on the news’ (BRSN) describes a strategy for exploiting a frequently
observed financial market price pattern. This pattern (BRSN) is characterized by security
prices rising prior to and falling subsequent to positively anticipated events.”).
69. See Robert A. Prentice, The Future of Corporate Disclosure: The Internet, Securi-
ties Fraud, and Rule 10b-5, 47 EMORY L.J. 1, 75 (1998) (“A company may not feel quite as
strong an impetus to squelch inaccurate rumors when those rumors are causing its stock
price to soar. Should the company do so? It probably should, because the truth will ulti-
mately come out. Then the company’s stock price will drop, alienating investors and per-
haps precipitating litigation.”).
70. See id. at 74 (“In many cases [involving injurious rumors], however, the company
may determine that a response is necessary in order to clear up misapprehensions or other-
wise give its side of the story.”); SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SEC ROUNDTABLE: MARKET
RUMORS AND TRADING HALTS 5 (Feb. 19, 1986) (comments of Arthur Levitt, Jr., Chair-
man of the American Stock Exchange, Inc.) (“A policy of ‘no comment,’ however, does
not help calm the volatility of the stock or allay the concerns of employees and sharehold-
ers. Mr. Schreyer said that he would like to have greater flexibility, in dealing with un-
founded rumors, to state that there is no truth to the rumors, without incurring a possible
duty to update.”).
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tect their reputations by communicating a prompt denial.71
Turning to TGS’s situation, if faced today, some of these market forces
would incentivize TGS to respond. The rumors, which generally reflected
positively on TGS, were partially true (in that there was a potentially
significant discovery) and partially false (in some of their bombast and
certainty). Under these circumstances, TGS would be motivated to re-
spond to the rumors in order to (1) build investors’ trust via a policy of
full disclosure to prevent the perception that people “in the know” have
an advantage when trading in the company’s securities; (2) prevent the
stock price from being so inflated by the rumors that it actually drops
upon eventual disclosure of the discovery; and (3) avoid alienating inves-
tors who believe the overly-hyped aspects of the rumors.
B. KEY PRESSURES ON ISSUERS TO REMAIN SILENT IN RESPONSE TO
EXTERNALLY-SOURCED MARKET RUMORS
Three key countervailing pressures operate to incentivize issuers to re-
main silent in response to externally-sourced market rumors: (1) liability
for misleading disclosure; (2) business reasons for silence; and (3) avoid-
ance of confusion.
1. Liability for Misleading Disclosure
As exemplified by the Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation, if an issuer
chooses to respond to market rumors, the issuer risks liability for securi-
ties fraud under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to the extent the disclosure is
materially misleading.72 Injured investors could potentially assert a pri-
vate right of action for damages, and the SEC could potentially assert an
enforcement action for penalties and other relief.
But, not all materially misleading disclosures are actionable as securi-
ties fraud. Three key post-Texas Gulf Sulphur developments lessen the
chilling impact of potential securities fraud liability, especially in private
civil litigation: (1) the heightened proof and pleading standards for the
element of scienter; (2) the safe harbor for forward-looking statements;
and (3) the narrowed pathways of recovery for misleading opinions.
71. See Allan J. Kimmel, Rumors and the Financial Marketplace, 5 J. BEHAV. ECON.
134, 140 (2004) (“Assuming a potentially harmful rumor begins to circulate, the firm
should be prepared to launch a crisis management plan, . . . [which] requires an immediate
response to the situation.”); W. Timothy Coombs & Sherry J. Holladay, Helping Crisis
Managers Protect Reputational Assets, 16 MGMT. COMM. Q. 165, 169-72 (2002) (reviewing
literature on crisis communication theory) (identifying “attack on the accuser” and “de-
nial” as the most effective crisis response strategies to protect a company’s reputation
when the company is faced with rumors that circulate false negative information).
72. See, e.g., SEC Release Notice, In re Carnation Co., Release No. 22214 (July 8,
1985), 1985 WL 547371, at *5 (“Whenever an issuer makes a public statement or responds
to an inquiry from a stock exchange official concerning rumors, unusual market activity,
possible corporate developments or any other matter, the statement must be materially
accurate and complete. . . . Thus, in the Commission’s view, an issuer statement that there
is no corporate development that would account for unusual market activity in its stock,
made while the issuer is engaging in acquisition discussions, may be materially false and
misleading.”).
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First, the scienter element of securities fraud is now arguably more dif-
ficult for plaintiffs to both prove and plead. In Texas Gulf Sulphur, the
Second Circuit held that, at least in an action for injunctive relief, the
SEC needed only to establish “a lack of due diligence on the part of
TGS.”73 In the companion private litigation, courts applied varying stan-
dards. For example, the Tenth Circuit required TGS to either prove that
“it did not know of the misrepresentation” or demonstrate “that with due
diligence TGS could not have known of the faultiness of the statement.”74
The court presiding over the class action in the Southern District of New
York held that “plaintiffs must show more than that the April 12 press
release was negligently prepared,” without resolving the degree of scien-
ter required.75
With respect to proving scienter, in 1976, the Supreme Court held that
a plaintiff must prove more than mere negligence in order to establish
liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.76 The courts of appeals agree that,
in order to prove scienter, a plaintiff must show that the defendant acted
intentionally or recklessly.77 However, there is an important caveat. Al-
though there is not a private right of action under § 17(a)(2) of the Secur-
ities Act, the SEC could avoid the need to prove scienter by bringing an
enforcement action under § 17(a)(2),78 which only requires proof of neg-
ligence.79 In addition, lower courts have broadly interpreted the remain-
ing elements of § 17(a)(2), such that a company’s statements about
publicly traded stock are potentially actionable.80
With respect to pleading scienter, in 1995, Congress enacted the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), which requires plaintiffs in
private civil actions to plead a strong inference of scienter, without the
benefit of discovery, in order to withstand a motion to dismiss.81 As inter-
73. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 863 (2d Cir. 1968).
74. Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 102 (10th Cir. 1971).
75. Astor v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 306 F. Supp. 1333, 1344 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); see also
Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 55 F.R.D. 308, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (approving settle-
ment of the Reliance Claims) (“The plaintiffs will have to prove at a jury trial . . . that some
degree of scienter can be attributed to the persons who prepared the press release.”).
76. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976) (“When a statute speaks
so specifically in terms of manipulation and deception, and of implementing devices and
contrivances—the commonly understood terminology of intentional wrongdoing—and
when its history reflects no more expansive intent, we are quite unwilling to extend the
scope of the statute to negligent conduct.”).
77. See, e.g., Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 318 n.3 (2007)
(“Every Court of Appeals that has considered the issue has held that a plaintiff may meet
the scienter requirement by showing that the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly,
though the Circuits differ on the degree of recklessness required.”).
78. See 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) (2012).
79. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 697 (1980).
80. See, e.g., SEC v. RPM Int’l, Inc., 282 F. Supp. 3d 1, 28–29 (D.D.C. 2017) (analyzing
the “in the offer or sale of securities” element) (“Many courts have concluded that an
allegation that the company’s stock was publicly traded is sufficient to plead this element
under Section 17(a)(2).”); id. at 29 (analyzing the “to obtain money or property” element)
(“An allegation that ties a company officer’s received bonus to the company’s performance
has been found to be sufficient to state a claim under Section 17(a)(2).”).
81. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(2) & (3) (2012).
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preted by the Supreme Court, plaintiffs must plead an “inference of sci-
enter cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference one
could draw from the facts alleged.”82
Second, the PSLRA introduced another protection from private civil
liability for defendants: the safe harbor for forward-looking statements.
Under the safe harbor, a defendant’s forward-looking statements, if ac-
companied by meaningful cautionary language, are not actionable.83 Con-
gress specifically intended to encourage companies to “disseminate
relevant information to the market without fear of open-ended
liability.”84
Third, as recently clarified by the Supreme Court in Omnicare, Inc. v.
Laborers District Council Construction Industry Pension Fund, although
statements of opinion can be actionable, there are only two narrow path-
ways to liability: (1) an opinion is actionable as an untrue statement of
material fact only if the opinion was disbelieved by the speaker; and (2)
an opinion can give rise to omissions liability to the extent the issuer fails
to disclose a fact showing that the company lacked the basis for expres-
sing the opinion that a reasonable investor would expect.85 If a plaintiff
seeks to impose liability under the second pathway, the plaintiff must
plead “particular (and material) facts going to the basis for the issuer’s
opinion—facts about the inquiry the issuer did or did not conduct or the
knowledge it did or did not have—whose omission makes the opinion
statement at issue misleading to a reasonable person reading the state-
ment fairly and in context.”86
Applying this liability risk to TGS today, by electing to respond to the
market rumors, TGS would still risk SEC enforcement, but the company
could significantly reduce the risk of private civil liability. With respect to
SEC enforcement, the SEC could potentially assert a claim under
§ 17(a)(2), thus invoking a negligence standard. And, even if the SEC
asserted a claim under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the PSLRA’s protections
(heightened scienter pleading standard, discovery stay, and safe harbor
for forward-looking statements) would not apply. The company could,
however, potentially limit its risk by expressing only opinions and ensur-
ing that the bases thereof were stated, thus undercutting the second liabil-
ity pathway under Omnicare.87 With respect to private civil liability, TGS
could further reduce the risk of liability by accompanying its forward-
looking statements with meaningful cautionary language, and the com-
82. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c) (2012).
84. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 32 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 731.
85. See Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 135 S.
Ct. 1318, 1327, 1332 (2015).
86. Id.
87. Id. (“[T]o avoid exposure for omissions . . . an issuer need only divulge an opin-
ion’s basis.”)
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pany could seek dismissal of any asserted claims on the basis of the
heightened scienter pleading standard.
In sum, although the risk of potential liability would incentivize TGS to
remain silent in the face of market rumors, TGS could craft a response
that limits its exposure, especially to private civil liability.
2. Business Reasons for Silence
Business reasons for maintaining confidentiality might also incentivize
an issuer to remain silent in the face of market rumors, particularly if the
rumors have a kernel of truth. Examples of such business reasons include
the potential that disclosure would benefit competitors,88 interfere with a
plan to acquire certain real estate,89 disrupt corollary negotiations,90 pre-
maturely commit the company to a course of action,91 interfere with pre-
liminary merger negotiations,92 or exacerbate a challenge facing the
company by rattling creditors or customers.93 Turning to TGS’s situation,
if faced today, none of the business reasons incentivizing silence would
apply. TGS had already completed the land acquisitions associated with
its exploration by the time the rumors began to circulate, and no other
business reason for confidentiality is indicated in the record.
3. Avoidance of Confusion
In certain circumstances, disclosure might actually increase confusion.
First, in a rapidly-changing situation, a series of successive disclosures
based on evolving information risks confusing investors.94 Second, if a
88. See Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 12 (1999) (“[P]ublic disclosure, ostensibly meant for investors, can
harm the issuer’s business when used by competitors.”).
89. NYSE AMERICAN LLC CO. GUIDE, EXPLANATION OF EXCHANGE DISCLOSURE
POLICIES § 402 (Dec. 21, 2016) (“Public disclosure of a plan to acquire certain real estate,
for example, could result in an increase in the company’s cost of the desired acquisition or
could prevent the company from carrying out the plan at all.”); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833, 850 n.12 (2d Cir. 1968) (“We do not suggest that material facts must be
disclosed immediately; the timing of disclosure is a matter for the business judgment of the
corporate officers entrusted with the management of the corporation within the affirmative
disclosure requirements promulgated by the exchanges and by the SEC. Here, a valuable
corporate purpose was served by delaying the publication of the K-55-1 discovery.”).
90. See State Teachers Ret. Bd. V. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 852–53 (2d Cir. 1981)
(“The ostensible purpose of this pledge of confidentiality was SASOL’s need to complete
delicate negotiations with the French government for financing prior to the contract’s
announcement.”).
91. See United States v. Koenig, 388 F. Supp. 670, 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (identifying as
“a genuine corporate interest” management’s interest “in keeping their options open with
regard to solving the European financial situation”).
92. See Brian M. O’Neil, MODERN CORPORATION CHECKLISTS § 19:21 (2017) (discuss-
ing the business reasons why parties to a potential merger might choose to remain silent).
93. See ALAN K. BROMBERG ET AL., 3 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES
FRAUD § 6:172 (2d ed. 2017) (“A classic example is the company in financial difficulty.
Disclosure of the difficulty may aggravate the company: credit may be withdrawn or availa-
ble only on crippling terms, orders may be cancelled, customers may go elsewhere, deposi-
tors may make a run on the bank.”).
94. See NYSE AMERICAN LLC CO. GUIDE, EXPLANATION OF EXCHANGE DISCLO-
SURE POLICIES § 402 (Dec. 21, 2016) (“Occasionally, corporate developments give rise to
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company has a general “no comment” policy, divergence from that policy
in a particular situation, such as to deny a specific false rumor, risks com-
municating to the market that “no comment” really means “we con-
firm.”95 As a result, the decision to respond to one rumor might change
the meaning of “no comment” in subsequent responses, potentially ren-
dering those subsequent “no comment” responses confusing or even
misleading.96
Turning to TGS’s situation, if faced today, the desire to prevent confu-
sion might counsel silence rather than premature disclosure. TGS knew
that it would have more concrete information about its potential discov-
ery in a matter of days. Under those circumstances, the desire to avoid
successive disclosures based on rapidly-changing facts would likely incen-
tivize TGS to remain silent until a disclosure containing definitive infor-
mation was possible.
C. COUNSEL’S LIKELY ADVICE TO TEXAS GULF SULPHUR TODAY
Weighing these competing pressures, counsel advising TGS today
would likely recommend that the company remain silent in response to
market rumors until definitive information is available. On the one hand,
the following pressures would likely incentivize immediate response: (1)
proactive compliance with NYSE listing standards, despite the absence of
an inquiry from the exchange; and (2) market forces, including prevent-
ing investors from feeling alienated (either because they were unaware of
the rumors or because they were overly buoyed by them) and limiting
inflation of the stock price by investors “buying on the rumor.” On the
other hand, the following pressures incentivizing silence would likely out-
weigh the aforementioned pressures: (1) the risk of liability for mislead-
ing disclosure, even with the protections afforded by the scienter element,
the safe harbor for forward-looking statements, and the Omnicare liabil-
ity standard for statements of opinion; and (2) the desire to avoid confus-
ing investors with successive disclosures in response to a rapidly-changing
situation.
Indeed, consistent with this likely advice to TGS, most commentators
recommend that companies implement formal, written “no comment”
information which, although material, is subject to rapid change. If the situation is about to
stabilize or resolve itself in the near future, it may be proper to withhold public disclosure
until a firm announcement can be made, since successive public statements concerning the
same subject (but based on changing facts) may confuse or mislead the public rather than
enlighten it.”).
95. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988) (citing Flamm v. Eber-
stadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1178 (7th Cir. 1987)) (“It has been suggested that given current mar-
ket practices, a “no comment” statement is tantamount to an admission that merger
discussions are underway. That may well hold true to the extent that issuers adopt a policy
of truthfully denying merger rumors when no discussions are underway, and of issuing ‘no
comment’ statements when they are in the midst of negotiations.”).
96. See Flamm, 814 F.2d at 1178 (“When a firm suddenly says ‘no comment,’ the in-
quisitor will realize that his suspicions have a foundation—yet the response may sow con-
fusion all the same.”).
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policies, which expressly state that companies will not respond to market
rumors, and that companies do not diverge therefrom unless an exchange
or the SEC compels disclosure.97 For example, the National Institute of
Investors Relations’ Sample Disclosure Policy includes the following
provisions:
Section 2(c). No Comment Policy
The Company shall follow the “no comment” policy detailed in Sec-
tions 9 and 10, which prohibits the Company from disclosing or re-
sponding to inquiries or commenting on rumors concerning analyst
or Company projections, potential transactions or unusual market
activity.98
Section 10. Public Comment on Transaction Discussions or Unusual
Market Activity
The Company generally will not comment on unusual market activity
or market rumors and generally will not disclose ongoing discussions
regarding potential transactions. . . . It is very important that the
Company adhere to this policy consistently. If the Company denies
rumors that are not correct, for example, the Company will not be
able to effectively give a “no comment” response to an inquiry re-
garding a rumor that is true or partially true. If contacted by some-
one outside the Company and asked to comment, the response given
by the Company should simply be “It is our policy not to comment
on rumors (or other applicable item)” or “No comment.”99
Therefore, after weighing the competing incentives for disclosure and
silence, companies in TGS’s situation today would likely remain silent.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF TEXAS GULF SULPHUR CASE STUDY
If silence by issuers like TGS in the face of externally-sourced market
rumors would be the optimal disclosure decision, then no adjustments
need to be made to the competing pressures on issuers facing rumors. If,
however, the marginal social benefits of disclosure would exceed the mar-
97. See, e.g., Jeffrey B. Rudman et al., D&O Liability in Cyberspace: Taking Advan-
tage of Technology Without Tripping over the Federal Securities Laws—Part III of III, 15
ANDREWS CORP. OFF. & DIR. LIAB. LITIG. REP. 16, 18 (2000) (“Generally, it is not advisa-
ble to respond to rumors about the company, whether these rumors appear on television,
in the newspapers or on the Internet. While a management’s instinct may be to respond,
especially when the rumor is patently offensive in nature (as many message board posts
are), turning the other cheek is usually the best course of action.”); Daniel L. Goelzer et al.,
Securities Law Compliance: Dealing with Analysts and the Press, C800 ALI-ABA 97,
156–57 (1992) (“[I]t is desirable to draft and implement a formal, written press policy
which outlines recurring situations in which the company will not comment. Such situations
might include inquiries regarding nonpublic merger negotiations; adverse personnel ac-
tions involving specific individuals; relations with suppliers; and unattributed rumors.”).
98. National Institute of Investor Relations, Standards of Practice for Investor Rela-
tions—Disclosure, app. B at ch. 2(c) (2014) (“Sample Disclosure Policy”).
99. Id. at ch. 10(a).
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ginal social costs thereof,100 then the pressures facing issuers should be
adjusted to incentivize issuers like TGS to respond.
A. ARGUMENT THAT SILENCE IS NOT SOCIALLY OPTIMAL
I contend that the socially optimal decision would be for an issuer in
TGS’s situation to respond to market rumors with a forward-looking
opinion disclosure about the potential for an ore strike. In a forthcoming
article, I have proposed a framework to identify the optimal issuer disclo-
sure choice among the following three options: (1) remaining silent; (2)
expressing the disclosure as an opinion (i.e., without certainty); or (3)
expressing the disclosure as a statement of fact (i.e., with certainty).101
Applying this proposed framework to TGS’s situation,102 I contend
that the marginal benefits of an opinion disclosure by an issuer like TGS
would exceed the marginal costs thereof. Where the market is plagued
with inflated rumors about the certainty of a major discovery (thus affect-
ing price accuracy, disrupting the efficient allocation of capital, and mis-
leading investors), the issuer has already incurred the costs to compile
information that is directly responsive to those rumors, and the issuer
would not be competitively harmed by disclosing information about the
potential discovery, I argue that the marginal benefits of providing more
accurate information to the marketplace would exceed the marginal costs
thereof. I further contend that disclosure in the form of an opinion rather
than as a statement of fact would be optimal under these circumstances,
because the informational value of the disclosure would actually be en-
hanced by the expression of the company’s uncertainty. In addition, if the
company forecasted that it would make additional, more concrete disclo-
sures when additional information becomes available, it would allay the
concern about confusing investors with successive disclosures.
And yet, as discussed above in Part III.C, in light of the competing
pressures on companies facing market rumors, counsel would be unlikely
to so advise TGS today. Therefore, I contend that the pressures on com-
panies facing market rumors should be adjusted to incentivize optimal
disclosure decisions.
100. See Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice is Not In-
vestor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1338–39 (1999) (“For each U.S. issuer, there is
a socially optimal level of disclosure. More information about the issuer and the resulting
increase in its share price accuracy produces social benefits in the form of improved selec-
tion of new investment projects, improved managerial performance, and reduced investor
risk. More information, however, entails additional social costs as well, such as the time
and talent of lawyers and accountants as well as the diversions of management and staff
time involved in gathering and providing the information.”).
101. See generally Wendy Gerwick Couture, Optimal Issuer Disclosure of Opinions, U.
CIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3102667.
102. Id.
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B. PROPOSAL TO INCENTIVIZE ISSUERS TO RESPOND TO RUMORS
In short, I propose two adjustments to the pressures on issuers facing
externally-sourced market rumors: (1) the exchange listing standards
should be amended to expressly permit a company to remain silent in the
face of market rumors, with the exchange’s permission, if confidentiality
is required for compelling business reasons; and (2) the incentives for
listed companies to comply with these revised disclosure listing standards
should be strengthened.
First, the exchange listing standards should be revised to take into ac-
count those circumstances where a company has compelling business rea-
sons to delay its response to market rumors. As discussed above in Part
III.A.2, the common wisdom is that exchanges already grant this excep-
tion, even though it is not included in the standards. This ad hoc approach
to the listing standards undercuts the overall authority of the standards,
inhibits companies from proactively contacting the exchanges, and causes
investor and company uncertainty about whether the listing standards are
being enforced.
Second, the incentive for companies to comply with the disclosure list-
ing standards, as amended, should be strengthened. In light of the ex-
isting pressures incentivizing disclosure and the liability protections
already in place, this adjustment need not be so draconian as affording
investors a private right of action for violating disclosure listing standards
or further insulating responses to market rumors from potential securities
fraud liability. Rather, a slight increase in the incentive to comply with
disclosure listing standards would be sufficient to offset the counter-
vailing pressures.
In particular, a listed company should be required to (1) annually cer-
tify to its exchange that it is not aware of any material noncompliance
with the disclosure listing standards; (2) promptly notify the exchange of
any material noncompliance with the disclosure listing standards; and (3)
disclose annually to investors, on its Form 10-K, any such notifications of
material noncompliance, as well as provide an explanation thereof.
Comparable, albeit more stringent, requirements already apply with re-
spect to a company’s compliance with the NYSE’s corporate governance
listing standards. The NYSE listing standards require the CEO of a
NYSE-listed company to annually certify to the NYSE that “he or she is
not aware of any violation by the company of NYSE corporate govern-
ance listing standards, qualifying the certification to the extent neces-
sary.”103 In addition, the CEO must “promptly notify the NYSE in
writing after any executive officer of the listed company becomes aware
of any non-compliance with any applicable provisions” of the corporate
governance listing standards.104 Finally, if the CEO notifies the NYSE of
103. NYSE LISTED CO. MANUAL § 303A.12(a) (Nov. 25, 2009), 2008 WL 23737130, at
*1.
104. Id. § 303A.12(b); see also THE NASDAQ STOCK MARKET RULES, RULE 5625
(2009) (“Notification of Noncompliance”) (“A Company must provide Nasdaq with
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noncompliance with the corporate governance listing standards, and if
that noncompliance is “material,” the company must file a current report
on Form 8-K, disclosing the date of the notification, the implicated stan-
dard, and “any action or response that, at the time of filing, the registrant
has determined to take regarding its noncompliance.”105
My proposal to incentivize compliance with disclosure listing standards
is less stringent than the requirements already in place to incentivize com-
pliance with corporate governance listing standards. First, the annual cer-
tification requirement would be on behalf of the company rather than the
CEO. Second, the certification would be limited to “material noncompli-
ance,” rather than “any violation.” Third, the prompt exchange notifica-
tion requirement would be triggered only by “material noncompliance,”
rather than “any non-compliance.” Finally, the SEC filing disclosing any
notifications of material noncompliance would be required annually,
rather than immediately.
This adjustment to the competing pressures on companies would likely
be sufficient to incentivize compliance with disclosure listing standards,
including the requirement that companies respond to market rumors.
Companies could, of course, continue to express those responses as opin-
ions or forward-looking statements, largely insulating them from private
liability. Neither the failure to disclose noncompliance to an exchange nor
the noncompliance itself would give rise to a private right of action
(rather, as they do now, exchanges could determine whether, and how, to
sanction noncompliance); however, the failure to disclose a notification of
material noncompliance on a company’s Form 10-K would potentially be
actionable as an omission.
V. CONCLUSION
Public companies today face the same quandary that TGS faced:
whether, and how, to respond to market rumors. On the one hand, SEC
mandatory disclosure rules, exchange listing standards, and market forces
may incentivize companies to respond to rumors. On the other hand, the
risk of liability for misleading disclosure, business reasons for confidenti-
ality, and the desire to avoid confusion may incentivize companies to re-
main silent. After balancing these competing pressures, most companies
today would likely choose silence. And yet, I contend that silence is not
the socially optimal response. Therefore, I argue that these countervailing
pressures should be adjusted slightly to incentivize companies to respond
to market rumors, and I propose a modest reform to accomplish that
adjustment.
prompt notification after an Executive Officer of the Company becomes aware of any non-
compliance by the Company with the requirements of this Rule 5600 Series [Corporate
Governance Requirements].”).
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